Year 501 Copyright © 1993 by Noam Chomsky. Published by South End Press.
Chapter 4: Democracy and the Market Segment 2/7
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2. The Flight of the Bumble Bee

In the current phase of intellectual corruption, it must be stressed that, like democracy and human rights, the economic doctrines preached by the rulers are instruments of power, intended for others, so that they can be more efficiently robbed and exploited. No wealthy society accepts these conditions for itself, unless they happen to confer temporary advantage; and their history reveals that sharp departure from these doctrines was a large factor in development.

At least since the work of Alexander Gerschenkron in the 1950s, it has been widely recognized by economic historians that "late development" has been critically dependent on state intervention. Japan and the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) on its periphery are standard contemporary examples. In a major study, 24 leading Japanese economists review the decision by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) after World War II to disregard prevailing economic theory and to assign a "predominant role in the formation of industry policy" to the state bureaucracy, "in a system that is rather similar to the organisation of the industrial bureaucracy in socialist countries." Each sector of industry has its section of the government bureaucracy, which works "in close co-operation" with an industry association. Heavy protection, subsidies and tax concessions, financial controls, and a variety of other devices were employed to overcome market deficiencies that would have prevented development. Rejecting standard doctrine, MITI determined that "long-term self-reliance for Japan would be delayed or even undermined by following its apparent comparative advantage into labour intensive sectors." The radical defiance of economic precepts set the stage for the Japanese miracle, the economists conclude. Western specialists do not disagree. Chalmers Johnson notes that Japan could be described as "the only communist nation that works."

Some have suggested -- only half in jest -- that Japan's support for the Brookings Institution and other advocates of standard doctrine is intended to reinforce belief in the classical theory, to the detriment of its commercial rivals.3

The same has been true of the NICs in Japan's periphery. In her important work on South Korean economic progress, Alice Amsden cites such factors as land distribution and wage-salary differentials that are equitable by Western standards, state intervention on the Japanese model to "get prices `wrong' in order to stimulate investment and trade," and high discipline of labor, but more strikingly, of capital, which is controlled by "price ceilings, controls on capital flight, and incentives that made diversification into new industries contingent on performing well in old ones." Much the same has been true throughout East Asia, she notes. Case by case, the record of export-led growth refutes the doctrines of the neoliberal "New Orthodoxy," economist Stephen Smith points out. Success was based "on activist trade and industrial policies" that deliberately alter market incentives to place "long-run development goals over short-run comparative advantage." The most extensive comparative study concludes that "periods of significant export expansion are almost always preceded by periods of strong import substitution" -- measures of state intervention in violation of the market (Chenery, et al.). The comparison of Brazil and the East Asian NICs is telling. Until 1980, they developed in parallel, with "active industrial and export policies" and import substitution. But the debt crisis compelled Brazil to adopt IMF-World Bank New Orthodoxy, elevating "trade liberalization over domestic growth objectives" and turning to the export of primary products, with grim consequences. The NICs, with much more powerful state controls, prevented the market disaster, barring capital flight and directing capital to investment.4

Meanwhile China, the one "Communist" country that has kept the Western experts at arms length, remains the only one with rapid economic development (along with vigorous repression and no pretense of democracy). "One phenomenal success has been `township and village enterprises', for the most part factories owned by rural farmers," which "now account for close to 20 percent of China's GNP, employing more than 100 million people," financial correspondent David Francis writes, quoting a World Bank spokesman who predicts that they "will most assuredly be the single most dynamic form of enterprise on the Chinese scene."

The German economic miracle also relied on its departures from standard precepts, from the 19th century. The post-World War II system involves elements of "corporatism," defined as the "broad concertation between employer and employee representatives across industries, which is usually established and sometimes continually supervised under state auspices" (Charles Meier), though this conception underplays the role of central financial institutions, "a particularly significant actor in the German political economy," Michael Huelshoff writes. "The Reagan nightmare of supply side economics and military Keynesianism" and its "fiscal recklessness and monetary astringency" have received particularly harsh criticism in Germany (James Sperling). The smaller successful economies adopt similar means. Thus Holland relied on cartels coordinated through the Ministry of Economic Affairs for its postwar economic reconstruction, regulating production, sales, supplies, prices, etc. Not all of the more than 400 still operating in 1992 will survive the EC, but the government announced that a "green light" will be given to "positive cartels" that offer protection for companies launching new technologies.

"A strict free-marketeer would declare the German economy, like the bumble-bee, theoretically incapable of flight," the Economist observes with puzzlement, reviewing such departures from orthodoxy as "well-trained and well-paid workers, who sit on oversight boards," "giant, bank-owned industries unbothered by shareholders, secure from predators and heedless of profit," high taxes, "cradle-to-grave welfare," and other sins: "the German economy's riposte to this ancient caricature is to fly." The theory remains in force, however.

Low wages do not appear to have been a major factor in late development, however attractive they may be to TNCs. "Neither Germany nor the United States industrialized by competing against Britain on the basis of low wages," Amsden points out, and the same was true of Japan, which undercut British textiles in the 1920s by modern production facilities more than low wages. In Germany and other successful economies, labor conditions and benefits are high, by comparative standards. A study of industrial productivity by MIT specialists notes further that Germany, Japan, and other countries that maintained the "craft tradition" with more "direct participation of skilled workers in production decisions" have been more successful in modern industry than the United States, with its tradition of deskilling and marginalizing workers in the "mass-production model"; lessened hierarchy, responsibility in the hands of production workers, and training in new technologies has also improved results in the US, they conclude. Economist David Felix makes a similar point in comparing Latin America and East Asia. Asians who were less subordinated to Europe and the US than Latin American elites did not assign such high status to foreign-made consumption goods, "allowing much larger segments of the craft sector to survive, accumulate, and modernize the technology," while also easing balance-of-payments pressures. Amsden attributes South Korea's success in part to reliance on workers' initiative on the shop floor in preference to managerial hierarchies.5

It is, however, not only "late development" that is crucially dependent on departures from doctrinal orthodoxy. The same was true of the "early development" of England, as already discussed. The United States as well. High tariffs and other forms of state intervention may have raised costs to American consumers, but they allowed domestic industry to develop, from textiles to steel to computers, barring cheaper British products in earlier years, providing a state-guaranteed market and public subsidy for research and development in advanced sectors, creating and maintaining capital-intensive agribusiness, and so on. Elimination of tariffs in the 1830s would have bankrupted "about half the industrial sector of New England," economic historian Mark Bils concludes.


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3 Fitzgerald, Between, citing Ryutaro Komiya, et al., Industry Policy of Japan (Tokyo, 1984; Academic press, 1988). Johnson, National Interest, Fall 1989.

4 Amsden, "Diffusion of Development: the Late-Industrializing Model and Greater East Asia," AEA Papers and Proceedings, 81.2, May 1991. See particularly her Asia's Next Giant. Smith, Industrial Policy; citing Hollis Chenery, Sherman Robinson, and Moises Syrquin, Industrialization and Growth: A Comparative Study (Oxford, 1986). Brazil, see ch. 7. Comparisons, see DD, ch. 7.7.

5 Francis, CSM, May 14, 1992. Amsden, op.cit. Huelshoff, Sperling, in Merkl, Federal. Ronald van de Krol, FT, Sept. 28; Economist, May 23, 1992. Dertouzos et al., Made in America. Felix, "On Financial Blowups and Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America," in Jonathan Hartlyn and Samuel A. Morley, eds., Latin American Political Economy (Westview, 1986). Also Lazonick, Business Organization, 43. Ibid., on the role of banks in German industrial development. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, Landes, Unbound, for extensive discussion.